Presidential candidate Richard M. Nixon is mobbed by supporters as he arrives at his Miami Beach headquarters in August, 1968. PHOTO: CORBIS/BETTMANN ARCHIVE
Donald Trump is not the first Republican who corrupted U.S. foreign policy by seeking the help of a foreign government to win the Presidency. In 2016, Trump called on and richly rewarded Vladimir Putin and Russia for helping him win his first bid for the U.S. Presidency. In 2019, Trump attempted to interfere with U.S. foreign policy to derail the campaign of a political rival, Joe Biden. Richard Nixon was the first President to subvert U.S. foreign policy to gain the Presidency in 1968.
After serving as Dwight Eisenhower's vice president for eight years, Nixon was defeated by John Kennedy in his own bid for the Presidency. Nixon attempted to revive his political career by running for Governor of California in 1962. Once again, he was defeated, and in an emotional press conference in which he blamed the press for his loss, Nixon renounced further political activity. After Kennedy's assassination in 1963, however, Nixon did begin to participate in fundraisers and speaking tours on behalf of other Republican candidates. It was not until he went on a world tour and met with leaders in Asia that he recognized the widening war in Vietnam as a path to the White House. But the formidable obstacle on that path was Lyndon Baines Johnson.
Two major political events that shaped LBJ's policies were the New Deal and the anti-Communist crusade following WWII. Of course, WWII and the Civil Rights movement were also important in shaping his political opinions.
After Kennedy's assassination propelled Lyndon Johnson into the White House, Johnson had to deal with what, for him, was the distraction of the Vietnam War. Johnson's primary concern was the bundle of domestic programs known as the War on Poverty and Civil Rights. LBJ did not back domestic programs because they were seen as a part of Kennedy's legacy and a way of solidifying his position as an accidental President. LBJ supported these programs because he saw them as a continuation of the New Deal, the program to which he had been committed since his entry into politics. Johnson saw increasing the opportunity for the poor and minorities as necessary for those people and a way of improving America. These programs were what Johnson believed would cement his place in history.
While Johnson did not want further involvement in Vietnam, he believed he could not abandon Vietnam to Communist aggression. In February 1965, eight American advisors were killed in Pleiku, and Johnson felt compelled to retaliate with an air campaign, Rolling Thunder, against the Communists. Despite Johnson's obfuscation about the escalatory path, he was on in Vietnam, he was convinced the American people would support the actions he was taking. Despite an increasing number of troops, the war seemed to be stalemated; public opinion had started to turn against Johnson, and Congressional opposition to the war had grown. To stem the growing public opinion, Johnson prompted the U.S. intelligence community to infiltrate and disrupt the civil rights and anti-war movements. At the same time, Johnson and administration spokesmen made the case to the public, media, and Congress that U.S. troops were making progress in Vietnam. These efforts came to a crashing defeat at the beginning of 1968, during the Vietnamese New Year celebration, Tet.
After serving as Dwight Eisenhower's vice president for eight years, Nixon was defeated by John Kennedy in his own bid for the Presidency. Nixon attempted to revive his political career by running for Governor of California in 1962. Once again, he was defeated, and in an emotional press conference in which he blamed the press for his loss, Nixon renounced further political activity. After Kennedy's assassination in 1963, however, Nixon did begin to participate in fundraisers and speaking tours on behalf of other Republican candidates. It was not until he went on a world tour and met with leaders in Asia that he recognized the widening war in Vietnam as a path to the White House. But the formidable obstacle on that path was Lyndon Baines Johnson.
Two major political events that shaped LBJ's policies were the New Deal and the anti-Communist crusade following WWII. Of course, WWII and the Civil Rights movement were also important in shaping his political opinions.
After Kennedy's assassination propelled Lyndon Johnson into the White House, Johnson had to deal with what, for him, was the distraction of the Vietnam War. Johnson's primary concern was the bundle of domestic programs known as the War on Poverty and Civil Rights. LBJ did not back domestic programs because they were seen as a part of Kennedy's legacy and a way of solidifying his position as an accidental President. LBJ supported these programs because he saw them as a continuation of the New Deal, the program to which he had been committed since his entry into politics. Johnson saw increasing the opportunity for the poor and minorities as necessary for those people and a way of improving America. These programs were what Johnson believed would cement his place in history.
While Johnson did not want further involvement in Vietnam, he believed he could not abandon Vietnam to Communist aggression. In February 1965, eight American advisors were killed in Pleiku, and Johnson felt compelled to retaliate with an air campaign, Rolling Thunder, against the Communists. Despite Johnson's obfuscation about the escalatory path, he was on in Vietnam, he was convinced the American people would support the actions he was taking. Despite an increasing number of troops, the war seemed to be stalemated; public opinion had started to turn against Johnson, and Congressional opposition to the war had grown. To stem the growing public opinion, Johnson prompted the U.S. intelligence community to infiltrate and disrupt the civil rights and anti-war movements. At the same time, Johnson and administration spokesmen made the case to the public, media, and Congress that U.S. troops were making progress in Vietnam. These efforts came to a crashing defeat at the beginning of 1968, during the Vietnamese New Year celebration, Tet.
Vietcong prisoner, Nguyễn Văn Lém, being executed by police chief General Nguyễn Ngọc Loan in Saigon; National Archives; Eddie Adams, photographer
The North Vietnamese Tet Offensive was a major military defeat for the Communists. U.S. losses (4,000) were 14 times less than Communist losses. Nonetheless, the Communists won the public opinion battle. For months, Johnson and the administration had been saying that the U.S. was grinding Communists down. Tet proved that was not true, although immediately after the fighting ended, there was an upsurge in the public's support for the war. Johnson had been considering whether to run for reelection. By March 1968, concerned about his health, sinking polls, and his domestic program at a standstill, Johnson decided not to run again. In a speech on March 31, 1968, announcing his decision not to run again, Johnson redoubled his efforts to end the war while preserving an independent South Vietnam. On April 3, North Vietnam and the U.S. entered talks to reach an end to the war. Negotiations began on May 13, with the North Vietnam demanding a stop to the bombing and the withdrawal of all U.S. forces. A stalemate ensued until the middle of October. Then, for the first time, the North Vietnamese offered to include South Vietnam in the negotiations if the U.S. stopped bombing.
The willingness of the North Vietnamese to include the South Vietnamese in the negotiations was one of the conditions the U.S. wanted. As a result of this movement by North Vietnam, Humphrey, who had lagged Nixon in the polls, began to move up. And Nixon became even more concerned that success in the peace talks could lead to his defeat. Nixon told his aide, H.R. Haldeman, to find a way to "monkey wrench" the negotiations. Nixon and his people had several pipelines to South Vietnam's President, Nguyen Van Thieu. The most essential pipeline was Anna Chennault. Chennault, the widow of General Claire Chennault, the leader of a voluntary air group that fought with Chana against Japan, was a pro-nationalist China lobby member and a Republican stalwart. Haldeman had Chennault contact Thieu and told him to refrain from participating in the negotiations until Nixon was elected. In addition, Nixon persuaded Chiang Kai-shek, President of Taiwan, and businessman Louis Kung to advise Thieu not to participate in talks until Nixon was elected.
A businessman, Alexander Sachs, alerted members of the Johnson Administration that Nixon was sabotaging the negotiations. Johnson then ordered the FBI to wiretap Chennault under the Neutrality Act and Foreign Agents Registration Act. The CIA also wiretapped Thieu's office in Saigon. The wiretaps proved to Johnson that Nixon had undermined negotiations. In a telephone conversation with House Minority Leader Everett Dirksen, Johnson called Nixon's act "treason." Johnson considered going public with Nixon's treason. However, Johnson would have had also to disclose that he had wiretapped South Vietnam, an ally. Further, if Nixon would win, despite the disclosure of his collaboration, Nixon's ability to govern would have been damaged. Humphrey, whom Johnson told of Nixon's subversion, did not go public for the same reasons.
Nixon collaborated with an enemy of the U.S. to win the U.S. Presidency. Johnson characterized this collaboration as treason because it quite possibly could have cost the lives of American as well as South Vietnamese troops. As many as twenty thousand U.S. troops died between the end of October and the eventual peace agreement reached between the U.S. and North Vietnam. Of course, even without Nixon's subversion, no agreement may have been reached between Johnson and the North Vietnamese. It was another three years before Nixon agreed to the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam, the bedrock condition Hanoi called for to end hostilities. But Nixon had known that subverting negotiations between Johnson and Hanoi would prolong the war and cost lives. It was a trade-off he was willing to pay for the Presidency. And while some Republicans like Dirksen clearly abhorred Nixon’s collaboration, the question remains: to what extent would Nixon’s act have been supported by the Republican Party?
The willingness of the North Vietnamese to include the South Vietnamese in the negotiations was one of the conditions the U.S. wanted. As a result of this movement by North Vietnam, Humphrey, who had lagged Nixon in the polls, began to move up. And Nixon became even more concerned that success in the peace talks could lead to his defeat. Nixon told his aide, H.R. Haldeman, to find a way to "monkey wrench" the negotiations. Nixon and his people had several pipelines to South Vietnam's President, Nguyen Van Thieu. The most essential pipeline was Anna Chennault. Chennault, the widow of General Claire Chennault, the leader of a voluntary air group that fought with Chana against Japan, was a pro-nationalist China lobby member and a Republican stalwart. Haldeman had Chennault contact Thieu and told him to refrain from participating in the negotiations until Nixon was elected. In addition, Nixon persuaded Chiang Kai-shek, President of Taiwan, and businessman Louis Kung to advise Thieu not to participate in talks until Nixon was elected.
A businessman, Alexander Sachs, alerted members of the Johnson Administration that Nixon was sabotaging the negotiations. Johnson then ordered the FBI to wiretap Chennault under the Neutrality Act and Foreign Agents Registration Act. The CIA also wiretapped Thieu's office in Saigon. The wiretaps proved to Johnson that Nixon had undermined negotiations. In a telephone conversation with House Minority Leader Everett Dirksen, Johnson called Nixon's act "treason." Johnson considered going public with Nixon's treason. However, Johnson would have had also to disclose that he had wiretapped South Vietnam, an ally. Further, if Nixon would win, despite the disclosure of his collaboration, Nixon's ability to govern would have been damaged. Humphrey, whom Johnson told of Nixon's subversion, did not go public for the same reasons.
Nixon collaborated with an enemy of the U.S. to win the U.S. Presidency. Johnson characterized this collaboration as treason because it quite possibly could have cost the lives of American as well as South Vietnamese troops. As many as twenty thousand U.S. troops died between the end of October and the eventual peace agreement reached between the U.S. and North Vietnam. Of course, even without Nixon's subversion, no agreement may have been reached between Johnson and the North Vietnamese. It was another three years before Nixon agreed to the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam, the bedrock condition Hanoi called for to end hostilities. But Nixon had known that subverting negotiations between Johnson and Hanoi would prolong the war and cost lives. It was a trade-off he was willing to pay for the Presidency. And while some Republicans like Dirksen clearly abhorred Nixon’s collaboration, the question remains: to what extent would Nixon’s act have been supported by the Republican Party?