President Ronald Reagan and Nancy Reagan Waving from the Limousine during the Inaugural Parade in Washington, DC, 1/20/1981. White House Photographic Collection
At the beginning of 1980, Ronald Reagan, the challenger, trailed Jimmy Carter in the presidential race. However, the overthrow of the Shah of Iran by radical Islamists led to an oil shortage. The results on the U.S. economy were brutal: a 40 percent jump in U.S. gas prices, gas shortages, long lines, and an inflation rate of 13.3 percent. These events helped lead to the most severe recession since the Great Depression and the onset of stagflation (slow economic growth and high unemployment). The American public was unhappy, as Carter's falling poll numbers showed. Republicans began savoring their expected takeover of the White House.
Surprisingly, as the polls turned in Reagan's favor, Republicans became more concerned about the possibility of some event derailing their expected victory. Reagan's campaign manager and trusted advisor, Bill Casey, was apprehensive about an "October Surprise," an unexpected event redounding to Carter's advantage. Casey believed that the failure of the Carter administration to secure the release of the hostages was mainly responsible for Carter's drop in the polls. Casey feared that an October Surprise, like Carter securing the release of the hostages, could rejuvenate the Carter campaign and lead to Carter's victory. Casey was determined to nip any potential October surprise in the bud.
Surprisingly, as the polls turned in Reagan's favor, Republicans became more concerned about the possibility of some event derailing their expected victory. Reagan's campaign manager and trusted advisor, Bill Casey, was apprehensive about an "October Surprise," an unexpected event redounding to Carter's advantage. Casey believed that the failure of the Carter administration to secure the release of the hostages was mainly responsible for Carter's drop in the polls. Casey feared that an October Surprise, like Carter securing the release of the hostages, could rejuvenate the Carter campaign and lead to Carter's victory. Casey was determined to nip any potential October surprise in the bud.
Ronald Reagan and his presidential-campaign chairman, William Casey, in June 1980. PHOTO: ASSOCIATED PRESS In the summer of 1980, Casey devised a three-part plan for preventing an October Surprise. The first part consisted of establishing a committee of foreign-policy experts to monitor global events, especially those related to Iran, and alert the Reagan campaign to develop mitigation measures. The second part of the plan involved sending John Connolly, a former Texas governor, and his mentee, Ben Barnes, to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel to relay a message to the Iranian government. Casey wanted these governments to let the Iranians know that they could expect a better deal for releasing the hostages from Reagan than from Carter. Connolly and Barnes, as directed, delivered Casey's message to the Middle East leaders. And the month after returning to Texas, they met with Casey for a debriefing. The third part of Casey's plan was to meet in Madrid with Ayatollah Mehdi Karrubi, a high-ranking representative of the Iranian government.
Various sources reported that Casey told Karrubi that Iran would get a better deal for the hostages from Reagan than from Carter. However, these accounts of a Madrid meeting were discounted because various investigators believed that Casey was at a conference in London. Recently, one investigator found evidence showing that Casey was in Madrid for one day before arriving at the London conference. Although Carter has received credit for negotiating the release of the embassy hostages, they were not released until one hour after Reagan was sworn in as president. As a result, some observers suspected that the Reagan campaign had interfered with Carter's negotiations for the release of the hostages.
To counter the suspicious timing of the hostage's release, Reagan's defenders cited two reasons. First, as governor, Reagan was well-known for being a hands-off manager who delegated the execution of his plans. Thus, it seemed reasonable that he would be unaware of all the activities other team members might have implemented without his knowledge. Casey's relationship with Reagan, an old friend, and his current campaign manager, lent support to Reagan, letting Casey run things. However, while Reagan could be oblivious about those issues in which he had little interest, he was dogged about those things he considered critical. (The extent to which Reagan was actively involved in the problems he was concerned about was seen in the Contra Affair.)
Second, Reagan was on a path to winning; it would have been counterproductive to do anything that might have prevented the campaign from winning the election. Casey, however, was vociferous in his belief that if Carter could engineer the release of the hostages, Carter could still defeat Reagan. And if Casey believed this, it is unlikely that Reagan would have had a different opinion. Reagan's lead in the polls had been up and down, although Carter was trailing by the summer of 1980. Why would Ragan gamble on making a deal with the Ayatollah? Despite those concerns, Reagan had another consideration. This run for president was Reagan's third; he was 69 years old. He would almost certainly not have another opportunity to run for president again. Also, Reagan's victory would help seal right-wing supremacy in the Republican Party.
Various sources reported that Casey told Karrubi that Iran would get a better deal for the hostages from Reagan than from Carter. However, these accounts of a Madrid meeting were discounted because various investigators believed that Casey was at a conference in London. Recently, one investigator found evidence showing that Casey was in Madrid for one day before arriving at the London conference. Although Carter has received credit for negotiating the release of the embassy hostages, they were not released until one hour after Reagan was sworn in as president. As a result, some observers suspected that the Reagan campaign had interfered with Carter's negotiations for the release of the hostages.
To counter the suspicious timing of the hostage's release, Reagan's defenders cited two reasons. First, as governor, Reagan was well-known for being a hands-off manager who delegated the execution of his plans. Thus, it seemed reasonable that he would be unaware of all the activities other team members might have implemented without his knowledge. Casey's relationship with Reagan, an old friend, and his current campaign manager, lent support to Reagan, letting Casey run things. However, while Reagan could be oblivious about those issues in which he had little interest, he was dogged about those things he considered critical. (The extent to which Reagan was actively involved in the problems he was concerned about was seen in the Contra Affair.)
Second, Reagan was on a path to winning; it would have been counterproductive to do anything that might have prevented the campaign from winning the election. Casey, however, was vociferous in his belief that if Carter could engineer the release of the hostages, Carter could still defeat Reagan. And if Casey believed this, it is unlikely that Reagan would have had a different opinion. Reagan's lead in the polls had been up and down, although Carter was trailing by the summer of 1980. Why would Ragan gamble on making a deal with the Ayatollah? Despite those concerns, Reagan had another consideration. This run for president was Reagan's third; he was 69 years old. He would almost certainly not have another opportunity to run for president again. Also, Reagan's victory would help seal right-wing supremacy in the Republican Party.
Blindfolded US hostages and their Iranian captors outside the US embassy in Tehran (Reuters) Casey and Connolly's message to the Iranians was that they would receive a better deal from Reagan than Carter. Although this message would have resonated with Khomeini because of his hatred for Carter (Carter had supported the Shah). Reagan also promised to offer more to release the hostages than Carter. Whatever Reagan was promising would eventually be paid by the American people. Iran was fighting a deadly war against Iraq and needed U.S. arms and replacement parts for the U.S.-equipped military the Shah had built. Because of the embargo Carter had placed on the direct sales of military equipment to Iran, Israel became a prime source for the Iranians. Israel could supply U.S. equipment, and Israel was more than willing to act as a middleman. Israel hoped to improve relations with Iran and saw Iraq as a more significant threat.
Any agreement between the Reagan campaign and Iran would involve commitments. Regardless of whether Reagan was involved, any commitments made to Iran would be a deal the Iranians could pressure the U.S. to keep. If Reagan had been engaged, those commitments to Iran would have been more likely fulfilled. Reagan, for example, publicly pledged to enforce the arms embargo against Iran. Even if Reagan had not been initially involved in dealing arms to Iran, it would have been nearly impossible to have fulfilled the agreement without letting him know. Reagan had promised that the U.S. would never ransom Americans held by terrorists. Yet, Reagan threatened to "call off the Iranian deal" unless the hostage, Cynthia Dwyer, the wife of Richard Allen, National Security Director's college roommate, was released by the Iranians, along with an Iranian American Rockwell International employee and three British missionaries. Ronald Reagan was directly involved in an arms-for-hostages negotiation despite his pledge not to engage in such swaps.
The circumstances of both the release of the embassy hostages and Cynthia Dwyer are strong circumstantial evidence that Reagan was involved in both arms-for-hostages deals. Reagan's inner circle members ensured his arms transfer participation was hidden. For example, there was evidence that Casey had met in Madrid with representatives of the Iranian government. This information was hidden and only discovered recently. Shielding Casey, Reagan's close friend, also shielded Reagan. Within three months of Reagan's inauguration, his Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, gave implicit permission for Israel to ship U.S.-made military spare parts and fighter planes to Iran. It was understood that the U.S. would replace the depletion of U.S. arms from Israel's stockpile to Iran.
Later, Haig denied that he had permitted the sale of arms to Iran. National Security Director Richard Allen claimed that Reagan's order to "call the deal off" if Cynthia Dwyer was not released referred to the Algiers Accords, an agreement between Iran and the U.S. negotiated by Carter. These Accords called for the release of Iranian funds held by the U.S. in return for the release of the hostages seized in the U.S. Embassy. Not only had the embassy hostages already been released, but it was also the position of the Reagan administration that the Accords were, in effect, paying ransom for hostages. The Reagan administration had foresworn any deals made with terrorists for the release of hostages. Reagan could ignore his promises when he chose.
Despite public pronouncements supporting a ban on arms sales to Iran and negotiations with terrorist groups like Hezbollah, the evidence seems clear that Reagan permitted arms to be sold to Iran through Israel. Another group of hostages was seized in 1984 by Hezbollah and included CIA Station Chief William Buckley, the Revs. Benjamin Weir, Lawrence Jenco, Peter Kilburn, David Jacobsen, Thomas Sutherland of American University, and Terry Anderson, an Associated Press correspondent. Reagan obtained the release of these hostages through arms sales to Iran.
The Reagan administration's sales of arms to Iran while censuring Carter's efforts to free the embassy hostages and pledging to renounce such deals was undoubtedly hypocritical. Equally portentous, however, was the Reagan administration's discovery of the template for freeing hostages held by Iran by selling them arms. Indeed, Reagan's agreements with the Iranians may have led to additional hostages being seized. As a result of having this arms-for-hostages template, Reagan's National Security Council wound up obtaining the resources needed to subsidize a covert war against the socialist government of Nicaragua.
Even before Reagan took office, he was convinced that the Carter administration's focus on human rights was misplaced. The new administration was confident that the Carter administration was allowing communism to take root in both Iran and throughout Latin America. Reagan was determined to reverse what he saw as a dangerous trend. The Reagan administration saw an opportunity in Iran. Fearing that the ongoing turmoil in Iran would provide an opening for Russia to exert its influence, Reagan agreed to improve relations with the Iranian government by selling its weapons. Iran, during the war with Iraq, needed heavier missiles. If the U.S. agreed to the sale, such U.S.-made missiles would be available through Israeli arms dealers. To ensure a U.S. agreement, the arms dealers offered the release of CIA station chief William Buckley. This offer and the Israeli government's urging convinced Reagan to give his final go-ahead. The U.S. sold missiles to Iran, although only one hostage, Reverend Benjamin Weir, was released.
Another opportunity occurred because a left-leaning government took power in Nicaragua – the Sandinistas - and spurred a rebellion by the Contras. From the first days of his presidency, Reagan had been covertly aiding the Contras. As Reagan's aid increased, Congress reacted by imposing increasingly restrictive limitations on the assistance that Reagan could bring to bear. By 1983, Congress had passed the Boland amendments prohibiting the U.S. from providing any military or paramilitary aid to the Contras. Reagan's response was to seek money for the Contras from other countries despite acknowledging that such assistance might violate U.S. law. Reagan's respect for the law seemed porous when the law conflicted with his wishes. By May 1984, the National Security Director, Robert McFarlane, was able to obtain "humanitarian" funds from Saudi Arabia that, over the next eight months, would total $32 million.
As military operations in Nicaragua increased and the need for aid grew, the Reagan administration, led by Colonel Oliver North and the NSC staff, struggled to keep the Contras supplied. Besides the logistical problems of secretly providing the arms for a war against the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, the cost of the war exceeded what the Saudis and other third parties provided. By December of 1985, North told the Israeli officials with whom he was selling weapons to Iran that he intended to use profits from the sale to fund the Contras. It is unclear whether Reagan knew these funds would be diverted to the Contras; it is immaterial. Reagan was breaking the law by funding the Contra attempt to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. And his administration was dishonest in claiming it would not sell arms to Iran. And the Reagan administration was hypocritical when it sought to convince other countries also to refuse to negotiate for hostages.
By the end of April 1986, the media was reporting on the U.S. role in providing military aid to the Contras. Based on these media reports, Congress and some government agencies began investigating these news stories. The Lebanese newspaper Al-Shira first reported on the Iran-Contra scandal in November 1986, exposing the secret operation of the U.S. government selling arms to Iranian militias. The report was based on a leak from Mehdi Hashemi, a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps official. The scandal became public after a plane carrying weapons to the Contras crashed in Nicaragua, and a surviving crew member, Eugene Hasenfus, made statements about U.S. involvement.
Reagan's staff protected him from association with the most grievous act – a deal with Iran to delay the release of the embassy hostages – by focusing on and admitting involvement in the later Iran Contra affair. It was this later 1986 arms for hostages deal that some of Reagan's closest advisors were found guilty. The Special Prosecutor, Lawrence Walsh, after a lengthy investigation, found no evidence that Reagan was involved in the Iran Contra affair, which he investigated. But, the Special Prosecutor did not consider all the facts we now have. In any event, Middle Eastern countries and groups likely learned of the duplicity of the Reagan administration. And the lack of confidence in the U.S. may have affected how these countries eventually acted toward the U.S.
Reagan and his closest advisors promised to sell weapons to the Iranians to win the presidency. And from the beginning of the Reagan administration, it fulfilled that promise. Reagan, the Great Communicator, called for a ban on weapons sales to Iran. He induced other nations to join the U.S. in upholding this ban. But Reagan lied and deceived Americans and those other nations in a cold-blooded and tempered way. As crucial as his deception was, he brazenly broke U.S. laws to achieve his right-wing ideological ends. His actions set the stage for later presidents to break laws and deceive Americans to achieve their foreign policy objectives. The Special Prosecutor who investigated Reagan's crimes admitted that he was unable to find complicity in Reagan's guilt. However, the Special Prosecutor did not consider the totality of Reagan's actions or have more evidence available. Above all, we now know the extent to which Reagan was willing to commit crimes to achieve his goals.
Any agreement between the Reagan campaign and Iran would involve commitments. Regardless of whether Reagan was involved, any commitments made to Iran would be a deal the Iranians could pressure the U.S. to keep. If Reagan had been engaged, those commitments to Iran would have been more likely fulfilled. Reagan, for example, publicly pledged to enforce the arms embargo against Iran. Even if Reagan had not been initially involved in dealing arms to Iran, it would have been nearly impossible to have fulfilled the agreement without letting him know. Reagan had promised that the U.S. would never ransom Americans held by terrorists. Yet, Reagan threatened to "call off the Iranian deal" unless the hostage, Cynthia Dwyer, the wife of Richard Allen, National Security Director's college roommate, was released by the Iranians, along with an Iranian American Rockwell International employee and three British missionaries. Ronald Reagan was directly involved in an arms-for-hostages negotiation despite his pledge not to engage in such swaps.
The circumstances of both the release of the embassy hostages and Cynthia Dwyer are strong circumstantial evidence that Reagan was involved in both arms-for-hostages deals. Reagan's inner circle members ensured his arms transfer participation was hidden. For example, there was evidence that Casey had met in Madrid with representatives of the Iranian government. This information was hidden and only discovered recently. Shielding Casey, Reagan's close friend, also shielded Reagan. Within three months of Reagan's inauguration, his Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, gave implicit permission for Israel to ship U.S.-made military spare parts and fighter planes to Iran. It was understood that the U.S. would replace the depletion of U.S. arms from Israel's stockpile to Iran.
Later, Haig denied that he had permitted the sale of arms to Iran. National Security Director Richard Allen claimed that Reagan's order to "call the deal off" if Cynthia Dwyer was not released referred to the Algiers Accords, an agreement between Iran and the U.S. negotiated by Carter. These Accords called for the release of Iranian funds held by the U.S. in return for the release of the hostages seized in the U.S. Embassy. Not only had the embassy hostages already been released, but it was also the position of the Reagan administration that the Accords were, in effect, paying ransom for hostages. The Reagan administration had foresworn any deals made with terrorists for the release of hostages. Reagan could ignore his promises when he chose.
Despite public pronouncements supporting a ban on arms sales to Iran and negotiations with terrorist groups like Hezbollah, the evidence seems clear that Reagan permitted arms to be sold to Iran through Israel. Another group of hostages was seized in 1984 by Hezbollah and included CIA Station Chief William Buckley, the Revs. Benjamin Weir, Lawrence Jenco, Peter Kilburn, David Jacobsen, Thomas Sutherland of American University, and Terry Anderson, an Associated Press correspondent. Reagan obtained the release of these hostages through arms sales to Iran.
The Reagan administration's sales of arms to Iran while censuring Carter's efforts to free the embassy hostages and pledging to renounce such deals was undoubtedly hypocritical. Equally portentous, however, was the Reagan administration's discovery of the template for freeing hostages held by Iran by selling them arms. Indeed, Reagan's agreements with the Iranians may have led to additional hostages being seized. As a result of having this arms-for-hostages template, Reagan's National Security Council wound up obtaining the resources needed to subsidize a covert war against the socialist government of Nicaragua.
Even before Reagan took office, he was convinced that the Carter administration's focus on human rights was misplaced. The new administration was confident that the Carter administration was allowing communism to take root in both Iran and throughout Latin America. Reagan was determined to reverse what he saw as a dangerous trend. The Reagan administration saw an opportunity in Iran. Fearing that the ongoing turmoil in Iran would provide an opening for Russia to exert its influence, Reagan agreed to improve relations with the Iranian government by selling its weapons. Iran, during the war with Iraq, needed heavier missiles. If the U.S. agreed to the sale, such U.S.-made missiles would be available through Israeli arms dealers. To ensure a U.S. agreement, the arms dealers offered the release of CIA station chief William Buckley. This offer and the Israeli government's urging convinced Reagan to give his final go-ahead. The U.S. sold missiles to Iran, although only one hostage, Reverend Benjamin Weir, was released.
Another opportunity occurred because a left-leaning government took power in Nicaragua – the Sandinistas - and spurred a rebellion by the Contras. From the first days of his presidency, Reagan had been covertly aiding the Contras. As Reagan's aid increased, Congress reacted by imposing increasingly restrictive limitations on the assistance that Reagan could bring to bear. By 1983, Congress had passed the Boland amendments prohibiting the U.S. from providing any military or paramilitary aid to the Contras. Reagan's response was to seek money for the Contras from other countries despite acknowledging that such assistance might violate U.S. law. Reagan's respect for the law seemed porous when the law conflicted with his wishes. By May 1984, the National Security Director, Robert McFarlane, was able to obtain "humanitarian" funds from Saudi Arabia that, over the next eight months, would total $32 million.
As military operations in Nicaragua increased and the need for aid grew, the Reagan administration, led by Colonel Oliver North and the NSC staff, struggled to keep the Contras supplied. Besides the logistical problems of secretly providing the arms for a war against the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, the cost of the war exceeded what the Saudis and other third parties provided. By December of 1985, North told the Israeli officials with whom he was selling weapons to Iran that he intended to use profits from the sale to fund the Contras. It is unclear whether Reagan knew these funds would be diverted to the Contras; it is immaterial. Reagan was breaking the law by funding the Contra attempt to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. And his administration was dishonest in claiming it would not sell arms to Iran. And the Reagan administration was hypocritical when it sought to convince other countries also to refuse to negotiate for hostages.
By the end of April 1986, the media was reporting on the U.S. role in providing military aid to the Contras. Based on these media reports, Congress and some government agencies began investigating these news stories. The Lebanese newspaper Al-Shira first reported on the Iran-Contra scandal in November 1986, exposing the secret operation of the U.S. government selling arms to Iranian militias. The report was based on a leak from Mehdi Hashemi, a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps official. The scandal became public after a plane carrying weapons to the Contras crashed in Nicaragua, and a surviving crew member, Eugene Hasenfus, made statements about U.S. involvement.
Reagan's staff protected him from association with the most grievous act – a deal with Iran to delay the release of the embassy hostages – by focusing on and admitting involvement in the later Iran Contra affair. It was this later 1986 arms for hostages deal that some of Reagan's closest advisors were found guilty. The Special Prosecutor, Lawrence Walsh, after a lengthy investigation, found no evidence that Reagan was involved in the Iran Contra affair, which he investigated. But, the Special Prosecutor did not consider all the facts we now have. In any event, Middle Eastern countries and groups likely learned of the duplicity of the Reagan administration. And the lack of confidence in the U.S. may have affected how these countries eventually acted toward the U.S.
Reagan and his closest advisors promised to sell weapons to the Iranians to win the presidency. And from the beginning of the Reagan administration, it fulfilled that promise. Reagan, the Great Communicator, called for a ban on weapons sales to Iran. He induced other nations to join the U.S. in upholding this ban. But Reagan lied and deceived Americans and those other nations in a cold-blooded and tempered way. As crucial as his deception was, he brazenly broke U.S. laws to achieve his right-wing ideological ends. His actions set the stage for later presidents to break laws and deceive Americans to achieve their foreign policy objectives. The Special Prosecutor who investigated Reagan's crimes admitted that he was unable to find complicity in Reagan's guilt. However, the Special Prosecutor did not consider the totality of Reagan's actions or have more evidence available. Above all, we now know the extent to which Reagan was willing to commit crimes to achieve his goals.