Mark Lilla’s argument in the Once and Future Liberal is that Democrats need to focus on their values and principals, rather than attempting to craft messages for different subsets through identify politics. While he makes important points, much of his message is prone to misinterpretation.
According to Lilla too many voters in our political process have been twisted around from “engagement with the wider world” to a focus on their inner self, grievances affecting their group, and thus, how our own grievances affects politics. Lilla says that this focus on the individual and his identity--the essence of identity politics--rather than on society as a whole, is generally a consequence of changes in family structure and child rearing. In addition, Lilla attributes this individualistic focus to Reaganism because it celebrated the picture of an “individualistic America where families and small communities and businesses would flourish one freed from the shackles of the state.” Liberals responded by adopting an identity politics in which groups sought to redress the grievances affecting them, rather than looking outward to address the grievances affecting society.
According to Lilla too many voters in our political process have been twisted around from “engagement with the wider world” to a focus on their inner self, grievances affecting their group, and thus, how our own grievances affects politics. Lilla says that this focus on the individual and his identity--the essence of identity politics--rather than on society as a whole, is generally a consequence of changes in family structure and child rearing. In addition, Lilla attributes this individualistic focus to Reaganism because it celebrated the picture of an “individualistic America where families and small communities and businesses would flourish one freed from the shackles of the state.” Liberals responded by adopting an identity politics in which groups sought to redress the grievances affecting them, rather than looking outward to address the grievances affecting society.
Channeling group grievances through political process obscures any reason for those who are not a member of that group to be invested in the remedy for that grievance. When groups use political action to seek redress for some issue affecting them, they are calling for redress from people who are not members of their group and whose experiences are unlikely to be the same as theirs. “The only way out of this conundrum is to appeal to something that as Americans we all share but which has nothing to do with our identities, without denying the existence and importance of the latter.” Lilla contends that the way out of this conundrum is to appeal to our citizenship in a common enterprise of which we are a legitimate part. In other words, to be most effective, we should recast our grievances into terms that are resonant with other groups. And, that means appealing to what we have in common: our citizenship and what we can do to elevate what citizenship means to all of us.
Interestingly, while the Progressive call for economic justice is outward looking and seeks to build solidarity, it can only build solidarity among those who feel disadvantaged and will disappear when their sense of disadvantage disappears. And, of course, the call for economic justice is lost on the better off voters. Religion, has also ceased to be an ally in the fight for economic justice. Now churches, especially evangelical churches, preach the same individualism and inward-looking focus that affect the rest of society. Moreover, Democratic Party rules were rewritten to open the Party to groups that it had previously been disenfranchised. One unintended consequence of marginalizing blue-collar unions and public officials was to make party spokesmen who could talk to non-educated elites inaccessible. The role of party spokesmen were left to educated elites. “We must relearn how to speak to citizens as citizens and to frame our appeals—including ones to benefit particular groups—in terms of principles that everyone can affirm. Ours must become a civic liberalism.” Thus, solidarity among Democratic voters was weakened.
A problem with Lilla’s argument is that it differentiates between two meanings of “identity politics” – recognizing voters’ interests, or setting objectives based on voters’ race, gender, and sexual identity. On the one hand identity politics can be a mobilizing tool in which the group membership of voters can be celebrated at dinners and parades. And Lilla, as most people involved in politics, finds it perfectly reasonable to mobilize voters on the basis of their group membership. On the other hand, Lilla objects to identity politics when it means group membership is used to channel specific political communications to them. As a primary example of identity politics as group centric political communication Lilla highlights the design of the Democratic Party’s home page. It consists of “a list of links titled ’People.’ And each link takes you to a page tailored to appeal to a distinct group and identity: women, Hispanics, ‘ethnic Americans,’ the LGBT community, Native Americans, African-Americans, Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders….There are seventeen such groups, and seventeen separate messages.” Instead, he would argue that the Dems should promote values all citizens could, such as the equal protection of law, marriage equality , etc. The different groups can then interpret how they may share the values.
Some observers have not recognized the dual meanings of identity politics. Many of those who have raged against Lilla have done so because they seem to have mistaken identity politics to channel communication with identity politics to mobilize voters. Moreover, some members of these various groups and identities suspect that the argument against communication directed toward identity groups may undercut the Party’s commitment to social justice for them. In light of the 2016 election, they see the criticism of identity politics as a way of raising the cultural concerns of the white working class at the expense of the advances they have made. Charles Kaiser, for example, disputes Lilla and argues that the gains of the gay rights movement in the last 50 years have been achieved through the identity politics of LGBT activists in the Democratic Party. However, most observers attribute a substantial reason for those gains to the solidarity families and neighbors felt with gays. That is, the gay movement benefitted from engagement beyond their group to the wider society.
Similarly, Lilla points out that the approach of Black Lives Matter is “a textbook example of how not to build solidarity.” Black Lives Matter decided to cast their issues in terms of identity politics, which invited dismissal of an issue that was vital to the entire society. “There is a reason why the leaders of the Civil Rights Movement did not talk about identity the way black activists do today, and it was not cowardice or a failure to be woke. The movement shamed America into action by consciously appealing to what we share, so that it became harder for white Americans to keep two sets of books, psychologically speaking: one for “Americans” and one for ‘Negroes.’” The message of the Civil Rights Movement was universal, stressing equal citizenship “more seriously than white America ever had.” To demand that whites accept African-American definitions of discrimination and injustice as a precursor to change is setting the bar too high. In democratic politics, change can be achieved if a sufficient number of voters can be convinced that the change is proper. And, influencing voters means transmitting messages that benefit all voters as well as aggrieved group.
The extremely negative reaction to Lilla’s argument is fueled by the difficulty some observers have had in rebutting two salient facts. First, liberals have been unable to sway large swaths, perhaps increasingly large swaths of voters, to vote for Democratic politicians at the local and State level. Second, the consequences of losing State and local elections is that liberals have lost the power to administer and enforce liberal laws passed at the national level. A clear example of this is abortion. Despite a pro-abortion ruling by the Supreme Court, the pro-abortion movement has suffered so many enforcement and regulatory setbacks from State and local officials that there are some states in which women find it virtually impossible to obtain a legal abortion. As Lilla says “it is one thing secure the constitutional right to abortion at the national level. It is quite another to guarantee that spurious barriers to obtaining one are not erected at the State and local levels.”
Lilla’s argument has flaws. He states that the “Republicans sought out wealthy donors to set up foundations and think tanks as safe spaces outside the university for elaborating the Reagan catechism, a document that grew from a cocktail napkin to a vast library of popular books and academic policy studies.” This is in direct contradiction to studies by many writers like Jane Meyer (Dark Money) and Nancy McLeod (Democracy in Chains) who found that wealthy donors set up foundations and think tanks to infiltrate and eventually take over the Republican Party. Also, he is silent about the role of Russia in the 2016 election, gerrymandering, election fraud, Fox News and the right wing noise machine. Nonetheless, this is a vitally important book for how the Democratic Party intends to prosper in the coming years. It is simply not enough for Democrats to shout into the wind that Hillary Clinton “really” won in 2016 and hope that the Electoral College magically disappears in 2020.
Interestingly, while the Progressive call for economic justice is outward looking and seeks to build solidarity, it can only build solidarity among those who feel disadvantaged and will disappear when their sense of disadvantage disappears. And, of course, the call for economic justice is lost on the better off voters. Religion, has also ceased to be an ally in the fight for economic justice. Now churches, especially evangelical churches, preach the same individualism and inward-looking focus that affect the rest of society. Moreover, Democratic Party rules were rewritten to open the Party to groups that it had previously been disenfranchised. One unintended consequence of marginalizing blue-collar unions and public officials was to make party spokesmen who could talk to non-educated elites inaccessible. The role of party spokesmen were left to educated elites. “We must relearn how to speak to citizens as citizens and to frame our appeals—including ones to benefit particular groups—in terms of principles that everyone can affirm. Ours must become a civic liberalism.” Thus, solidarity among Democratic voters was weakened.
A problem with Lilla’s argument is that it differentiates between two meanings of “identity politics” – recognizing voters’ interests, or setting objectives based on voters’ race, gender, and sexual identity. On the one hand identity politics can be a mobilizing tool in which the group membership of voters can be celebrated at dinners and parades. And Lilla, as most people involved in politics, finds it perfectly reasonable to mobilize voters on the basis of their group membership. On the other hand, Lilla objects to identity politics when it means group membership is used to channel specific political communications to them. As a primary example of identity politics as group centric political communication Lilla highlights the design of the Democratic Party’s home page. It consists of “a list of links titled ’People.’ And each link takes you to a page tailored to appeal to a distinct group and identity: women, Hispanics, ‘ethnic Americans,’ the LGBT community, Native Americans, African-Americans, Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders….There are seventeen such groups, and seventeen separate messages.” Instead, he would argue that the Dems should promote values all citizens could, such as the equal protection of law, marriage equality , etc. The different groups can then interpret how they may share the values.
Some observers have not recognized the dual meanings of identity politics. Many of those who have raged against Lilla have done so because they seem to have mistaken identity politics to channel communication with identity politics to mobilize voters. Moreover, some members of these various groups and identities suspect that the argument against communication directed toward identity groups may undercut the Party’s commitment to social justice for them. In light of the 2016 election, they see the criticism of identity politics as a way of raising the cultural concerns of the white working class at the expense of the advances they have made. Charles Kaiser, for example, disputes Lilla and argues that the gains of the gay rights movement in the last 50 years have been achieved through the identity politics of LGBT activists in the Democratic Party. However, most observers attribute a substantial reason for those gains to the solidarity families and neighbors felt with gays. That is, the gay movement benefitted from engagement beyond their group to the wider society.
Similarly, Lilla points out that the approach of Black Lives Matter is “a textbook example of how not to build solidarity.” Black Lives Matter decided to cast their issues in terms of identity politics, which invited dismissal of an issue that was vital to the entire society. “There is a reason why the leaders of the Civil Rights Movement did not talk about identity the way black activists do today, and it was not cowardice or a failure to be woke. The movement shamed America into action by consciously appealing to what we share, so that it became harder for white Americans to keep two sets of books, psychologically speaking: one for “Americans” and one for ‘Negroes.’” The message of the Civil Rights Movement was universal, stressing equal citizenship “more seriously than white America ever had.” To demand that whites accept African-American definitions of discrimination and injustice as a precursor to change is setting the bar too high. In democratic politics, change can be achieved if a sufficient number of voters can be convinced that the change is proper. And, influencing voters means transmitting messages that benefit all voters as well as aggrieved group.
The extremely negative reaction to Lilla’s argument is fueled by the difficulty some observers have had in rebutting two salient facts. First, liberals have been unable to sway large swaths, perhaps increasingly large swaths of voters, to vote for Democratic politicians at the local and State level. Second, the consequences of losing State and local elections is that liberals have lost the power to administer and enforce liberal laws passed at the national level. A clear example of this is abortion. Despite a pro-abortion ruling by the Supreme Court, the pro-abortion movement has suffered so many enforcement and regulatory setbacks from State and local officials that there are some states in which women find it virtually impossible to obtain a legal abortion. As Lilla says “it is one thing secure the constitutional right to abortion at the national level. It is quite another to guarantee that spurious barriers to obtaining one are not erected at the State and local levels.”
Lilla’s argument has flaws. He states that the “Republicans sought out wealthy donors to set up foundations and think tanks as safe spaces outside the university for elaborating the Reagan catechism, a document that grew from a cocktail napkin to a vast library of popular books and academic policy studies.” This is in direct contradiction to studies by many writers like Jane Meyer (Dark Money) and Nancy McLeod (Democracy in Chains) who found that wealthy donors set up foundations and think tanks to infiltrate and eventually take over the Republican Party. Also, he is silent about the role of Russia in the 2016 election, gerrymandering, election fraud, Fox News and the right wing noise machine. Nonetheless, this is a vitally important book for how the Democratic Party intends to prosper in the coming years. It is simply not enough for Democrats to shout into the wind that Hillary Clinton “really” won in 2016 and hope that the Electoral College magically disappears in 2020.