We all practice the mental shortcut of fitting our new experiences into our past experiences. Often this practice is efficient and can save us the tedium of relearning essential lessons. But sometimes, using previously developed frames can lead to serious miscalculations. The Russian invasion of Ukraine provides a textbook study of both the benefits and costs of applying previously developed frames to our current situations. Also, this invasion shows how we can let the lack of a previously developed frame freeze our actions.
One of the frames some commentators have used is that of race. Some media commentators have used the U.S. experience with race as an overlay for understanding the discrimination faced by African and Indian students living in Ukraine. As these nonwhite students fled the Russian onslaught, some Ukrainian officials refused them access to the trains and buses provided for Ukrainians. Black and brown students, however, are not Ukrainian citizens. Ukrainian officials may have considered Ukrainian citizens at greater risk than international students. Alternatively, officials may have believed that the wives and children of Ukrainian men who fought Russian soldiers deserved special privileges. In either event, racial discrimination is always wrong. But commentators should not suggest that the discrimination faced by international students fleeing Russian invaders is the same as the racial discrimination faced by U.S. nonwhite citizens in the U.S.
One of the frames some commentators have used is that of race. Some media commentators have used the U.S. experience with race as an overlay for understanding the discrimination faced by African and Indian students living in Ukraine. As these nonwhite students fled the Russian onslaught, some Ukrainian officials refused them access to the trains and buses provided for Ukrainians. Black and brown students, however, are not Ukrainian citizens. Ukrainian officials may have considered Ukrainian citizens at greater risk than international students. Alternatively, officials may have believed that the wives and children of Ukrainian men who fought Russian soldiers deserved special privileges. In either event, racial discrimination is always wrong. But commentators should not suggest that the discrimination faced by international students fleeing Russian invaders is the same as the racial discrimination faced by U.S. nonwhite citizens in the U.S.
Another frame being applied to the Russian invasion of Ukraine is British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's conduct during the early days of World War II. Specifically, the Churchill frame is being used to assess the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky's conduct. Both men rallied the country's flailing spirits during the depths of a war neither country seemed capable of winning. In part, because of Churchill's ability to inspire the British people, Great Britain persevered until the U.S. and Russia joined the fight against fascist Germany, Italy, and Japan. Whether Zelensky will be able to defeat Putin, a new fascist leader, ultimately is unclear. But he has shown the ability to inspire Ukrainians and anti-fascists across the globe.
The "Zelensky as Churchill" frame seems correct because of the number of points shared between Churchill and Zelensky (i.e., a smaller country besieged by a larger one, a valiant struggle that reverses the expected outcome, and a leader whose words inspire the spirit of the smaller country's people. But regardless of the ultimate correctness of the frame, its presence is a template that can help guide decision-making. Alternatively, the lack of a frame can paralyze decision-makers. Putin's nuclear saber-rattling in Ukraine has been reminiscent of the danger posed by the Cuban missile crisis. There are, however, significant differences between the missile crisis and Ukraine. In the Cuban missile crisis, the U.S. was a direct participant, along with Russia, in trying to avert a nuclear exchange. In the Ukraine/Russian conflict, the U.S. is one of several neutral allies trying to avoid escalating the conflict into a nuclear exchange while maintaining cooperation among the allies and militarily supporting Ukraine. As a result, the U.S. must weigh its actions against the allies' potential for escalation and dissensus.
Lacking an optimal frame for charting their course, Biden and the NATO allies seem to be unsure about their approach to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Of course, it isn't easy to reach and maintain consensus as an alliance. Nonetheless, the alliance must be maintained even though the NATO Treaty does not afford Ukraine the protection it offers its members. But how NATO members and the rest of Europe are threatened has changed. Non-state-sponsored terrorists now threaten NATO members, and the member nations recognize this threat. When terrorists attacked the U.S. on 9/11, NATO members, acting according to Article 5 of the treaty, joined the U.S. in military action against the terrorists. As many former members of the former Soviet Union recognize, Russia poses a threat to them if the Russian military is allowed to encroach on Ukraine's territory. Russia has launched secret attacks on neighboring countries using a variety of techniques. It has used "ghost soldiers" who hide their affiliation with Russia; disinformation spread through social media and "agents of influence" to undermine institutions and create chaos, and cyber-attacks to disrupt communications vital services it de-legitimize governments.
While some of NATO's tentativeness may be due to its determination not to escalate the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, NATO seems to be deferring to Putin's possible objections to actions it might take to aid Ukraine. For example, Biden and NATO allies have expressed concern that if it allows Poland to transfer additional MIG fighter jets to Ukraine, Putin might consider this escalatory. The NATO position on the MIG fighter jets seems contradictory because NATO has pledged sophisticated anti-missile missile systems to Ukraine. These anti-missile systems will allow Ukraine to down incoming missiles just as the MIG fighter jets do. In the meantime, Putin continues to escalate the war by choosing to attack more and more civilian targets. NATO's intent to avoid acts that Russia might consider escalatory is laudable. But in effect, NATO is allowing Putin to determine how it can aid Ukraine. Putin has said that he believes the transfer of any weapons to Ukraine by NATO to be escalatory. And he has also said the imposition of sanctions against Russia is escalatory.
NATO's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been inadequate. Russia has caused the displacement of ten million people from their homes and the destruction of wide swaths of a country. Regardless of what countries are members of NATO, it was formed to prevent such tragedies. The Ukrainian invasion did not start when Russian tanks rolled across the Ukrainian borders. Since March of 2014, when Russia seized the Crimea region of Ukraine, Russian began a ghost war in the Donbas region of Ukraine. Russian soldiers in uniforms without insignia started a years-long plan to seize all of Ukraine. Russia used disinformation and propaganda to blame concern about potential aggression by NATO to justify their aggression against Ukraine. This disinformation campaign coincided with an attack on democratic nations. Russia has corrupted politicians and the political systems of France, the U.S., and other European countries. Also, Russia and other autocracies have attacked democratic countries by undermining their financial institutions through money laundering and dark money. In part, the success of this propaganda war has made NATO leery of "escalating" the conflict in Ukraine. It has led to a severe mismatch between what the western nations say are the consequences of allowing Russia to seize Ukraine and their willingness to go all out in providing the armaments Ukraine needs to win.
NATO and the western nations need to adopt a frame that recognizes how the military and political rules of the game have changed. NATO should consider at least three building blocks for a new frame. First, NATO might need to redefine how it ensures peace in Europe. As Russia has demonstrated, attacking nations includes more than conventional military means. Russia has used disinformation, cyber-attacks, and other forms of deception, such as corrupting other nations' politicians and political institutions and subverting the integrity of their financial markets with dark money. Second, NATO should consider itself in a perpetual war against autocracies rather than responding to occasional eruptions of international violence. It is now clear that the groundwork for Russia's invasion of Ukraine began with Russia's seizure of Crimea. Thus, NATO had eight years to prepare for the Ukrainian invasion. Yet, it failed to meet Russia's preparations with countermeasures. Its primary plan was to hope that Putin could be satisfied with Crimea and then the Donbas. Third, NATO should consider the need to counter disinformation, propaganda, agents of influence, ghost armies, and other deceptions that nations can use to deny their aggression. Over the last 15 years, Russia has used these and other techniques to attack and subvert other countries. Yet, NATO has proven itself helpless to respond. The old rules that guided nations through World War II and much of the Cold War have changed. As a result, NATO must change its approach to security to remain an effective deterrent to aggression.
The "Zelensky as Churchill" frame seems correct because of the number of points shared between Churchill and Zelensky (i.e., a smaller country besieged by a larger one, a valiant struggle that reverses the expected outcome, and a leader whose words inspire the spirit of the smaller country's people. But regardless of the ultimate correctness of the frame, its presence is a template that can help guide decision-making. Alternatively, the lack of a frame can paralyze decision-makers. Putin's nuclear saber-rattling in Ukraine has been reminiscent of the danger posed by the Cuban missile crisis. There are, however, significant differences between the missile crisis and Ukraine. In the Cuban missile crisis, the U.S. was a direct participant, along with Russia, in trying to avert a nuclear exchange. In the Ukraine/Russian conflict, the U.S. is one of several neutral allies trying to avoid escalating the conflict into a nuclear exchange while maintaining cooperation among the allies and militarily supporting Ukraine. As a result, the U.S. must weigh its actions against the allies' potential for escalation and dissensus.
Lacking an optimal frame for charting their course, Biden and the NATO allies seem to be unsure about their approach to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Of course, it isn't easy to reach and maintain consensus as an alliance. Nonetheless, the alliance must be maintained even though the NATO Treaty does not afford Ukraine the protection it offers its members. But how NATO members and the rest of Europe are threatened has changed. Non-state-sponsored terrorists now threaten NATO members, and the member nations recognize this threat. When terrorists attacked the U.S. on 9/11, NATO members, acting according to Article 5 of the treaty, joined the U.S. in military action against the terrorists. As many former members of the former Soviet Union recognize, Russia poses a threat to them if the Russian military is allowed to encroach on Ukraine's territory. Russia has launched secret attacks on neighboring countries using a variety of techniques. It has used "ghost soldiers" who hide their affiliation with Russia; disinformation spread through social media and "agents of influence" to undermine institutions and create chaos, and cyber-attacks to disrupt communications vital services it de-legitimize governments.
While some of NATO's tentativeness may be due to its determination not to escalate the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, NATO seems to be deferring to Putin's possible objections to actions it might take to aid Ukraine. For example, Biden and NATO allies have expressed concern that if it allows Poland to transfer additional MIG fighter jets to Ukraine, Putin might consider this escalatory. The NATO position on the MIG fighter jets seems contradictory because NATO has pledged sophisticated anti-missile missile systems to Ukraine. These anti-missile systems will allow Ukraine to down incoming missiles just as the MIG fighter jets do. In the meantime, Putin continues to escalate the war by choosing to attack more and more civilian targets. NATO's intent to avoid acts that Russia might consider escalatory is laudable. But in effect, NATO is allowing Putin to determine how it can aid Ukraine. Putin has said that he believes the transfer of any weapons to Ukraine by NATO to be escalatory. And he has also said the imposition of sanctions against Russia is escalatory.
NATO's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been inadequate. Russia has caused the displacement of ten million people from their homes and the destruction of wide swaths of a country. Regardless of what countries are members of NATO, it was formed to prevent such tragedies. The Ukrainian invasion did not start when Russian tanks rolled across the Ukrainian borders. Since March of 2014, when Russia seized the Crimea region of Ukraine, Russian began a ghost war in the Donbas region of Ukraine. Russian soldiers in uniforms without insignia started a years-long plan to seize all of Ukraine. Russia used disinformation and propaganda to blame concern about potential aggression by NATO to justify their aggression against Ukraine. This disinformation campaign coincided with an attack on democratic nations. Russia has corrupted politicians and the political systems of France, the U.S., and other European countries. Also, Russia and other autocracies have attacked democratic countries by undermining their financial institutions through money laundering and dark money. In part, the success of this propaganda war has made NATO leery of "escalating" the conflict in Ukraine. It has led to a severe mismatch between what the western nations say are the consequences of allowing Russia to seize Ukraine and their willingness to go all out in providing the armaments Ukraine needs to win.
NATO and the western nations need to adopt a frame that recognizes how the military and political rules of the game have changed. NATO should consider at least three building blocks for a new frame. First, NATO might need to redefine how it ensures peace in Europe. As Russia has demonstrated, attacking nations includes more than conventional military means. Russia has used disinformation, cyber-attacks, and other forms of deception, such as corrupting other nations' politicians and political institutions and subverting the integrity of their financial markets with dark money. Second, NATO should consider itself in a perpetual war against autocracies rather than responding to occasional eruptions of international violence. It is now clear that the groundwork for Russia's invasion of Ukraine began with Russia's seizure of Crimea. Thus, NATO had eight years to prepare for the Ukrainian invasion. Yet, it failed to meet Russia's preparations with countermeasures. Its primary plan was to hope that Putin could be satisfied with Crimea and then the Donbas. Third, NATO should consider the need to counter disinformation, propaganda, agents of influence, ghost armies, and other deceptions that nations can use to deny their aggression. Over the last 15 years, Russia has used these and other techniques to attack and subvert other countries. Yet, NATO has proven itself helpless to respond. The old rules that guided nations through World War II and much of the Cold War have changed. As a result, NATO must change its approach to security to remain an effective deterrent to aggression.