House Minority Whip Steny Hoyer, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, Rep. Eric Swalwell, Rep. Joe Crowley and Rep. James Clyburn after Republicans withdrew their health care bill in March. Drew Angerer/Getty Images
Diagnosing Democratic Party Problems
Following Hillary Clinton’s loss to Donald Trump and Democrats’ losses in four special elections, a favorite parlor game has become identifying the deficiencies in the Democratic Party’s organizing values and messaging. While the analysts making these diagnoses cite the 2016 election, 2017 special elections, and state and local elections since 2010, many of the conclusions they draw seem at odds with the experiences of ordinary voters. For example, some analysts seem so fixated on the demographic trends that are supposed propel Democrats to victory, they refuse to look at the unique issues and populations within the specific states and districts being contested. As a result, they are surprised when national demographic trends fail to predict the outcome of these state and local elections, like in Jon Ossoff’s losing bid to win a House seat in Georgia’s Sixth District.
In addition, some analysts fail to recognize that the impact of demography on voting is mediated by social conventions (see How the Irish Became White by Noel Ignatiev). Already, there is a concerted effort by some right wing members to shift the definition of Latinos and Asians from people of color to white. Richard Spence, one of the leading voices in the fascist, alt-right, has equivocated on how he views the racial status of Latinos.
Following Hillary Clinton’s loss to Donald Trump and Democrats’ losses in four special elections, a favorite parlor game has become identifying the deficiencies in the Democratic Party’s organizing values and messaging. While the analysts making these diagnoses cite the 2016 election, 2017 special elections, and state and local elections since 2010, many of the conclusions they draw seem at odds with the experiences of ordinary voters. For example, some analysts seem so fixated on the demographic trends that are supposed propel Democrats to victory, they refuse to look at the unique issues and populations within the specific states and districts being contested. As a result, they are surprised when national demographic trends fail to predict the outcome of these state and local elections, like in Jon Ossoff’s losing bid to win a House seat in Georgia’s Sixth District.
In addition, some analysts fail to recognize that the impact of demography on voting is mediated by social conventions (see How the Irish Became White by Noel Ignatiev). Already, there is a concerted effort by some right wing members to shift the definition of Latinos and Asians from people of color to white. Richard Spence, one of the leading voices in the fascist, alt-right, has equivocated on how he views the racial status of Latinos.
Some Democrats rebuke the Democratic Party for having ceased to represent workers. While this sentiment is understandable, it is factually wrong. The greatest Democratic victories of the Democratic Party under Franklin Roosevelt included the support of Southern farmers as well as urban factory workers. And, the Party did not set about fracturing that coalition, but rather stumbled into it as it tried to preserve a coalition that included more urban minorities who also demanded civil rights. Regardless of whether the Democratic Party once represented workers, today union membership has decreased and the composition of the workforce has changed.
Union membership has declined from high of about 30 percent in 1950 to about 11 percent. Workers have also changed in how they see themselves: workers no longer see themselves as allied to each other because they hold similar jobs in an industry, but see themselves more as more aligned with management because their job role is defined by management. The definition of a working-class voter has changed; middle-class voters form a solid core of the Democratic Party; and the number of voters who have dropped into the category of poor has expanded. There are not enough “workers” in the traditional Democratic sense for the Party to win national elections.
Other Democrats call for the Democratic Party to be more like the Republican Party. By calling for the Democratic Party to become more like the Republican Party most disgruntled Democrats usually mean that the Party should become more aggressive and willing to do whatever it takes to win (e.g., gerrymander, suppress votes, and more); practice message discipline; and say or promise whatever voters want to convince them to vote Democratic. Those calling for mimicry of Republican Party, however, may not realize the extent to which the GOP changed from the party of Gerald Ford to become a cult of white voters.
Still other Democrats argue that the Democratic Party cannot be successful unless it gets money out of politics, eliminates the Electoral College, and ends voter suppression. But, those Democrats proposing changes in how elections are financed and conducted do not seem to understand how powerless the Democrats are to implement them in the face of Republican opposition to the very mechanisms that brought them to power.
All of these proposals have merit, despite any obstacles to implementing them. But, they miss addressing the key factor that has undermined the ability of the Democratic Party to win at both the national and local level: resistance by working-class whites to accepting the equality of people of color. Put simply, some white voters—more than the 20 percent who are Trump’s base--vote for Republicans because they believe the GOP better represents the cultural interests of white voters than the Democratic Party. And, to the extent that these cultural interests include resentment of people of color, an important part of the Democratic Party, they are correct.
To appeal to white voters who resent people of color, the Democratic Party needs to develop policies that counter the Republican Party’s appeal to racial resentment. Although the Democratic Party seems intent on pretending that Trump’s appeal to the white working-class is primarily due to economic insecurity, the empirical evidence shows that racial resentment rather than economics drove that vote. Trump voters want legitimacy to assuage their racial resentment, but given the base of the Democratic Party, the legitimation of white racial resentment is the one thing the Party cannot provide.
To make inroads against white racial resentment the Democratic Party must make the case that the upper 1 percent who fund the Republican Party have deliberately sharpened racial resentment to divide the bottom 99 percent. By dividing the 99 percent, they have undermined the commitment to the general welfare and weakened the civic obligation to provide for the common good. (see Democracy in Chains by Nancy MacLean) The general welfare and common good includes access to health care, educational benefits, safety net assurances (i.e., social security, programs for the poor and disabled, temporary unemployment assistance, and retraining programs for workers displaced by technical innovations and market dislocations), regulations to protect the environment, worker and public safety, and financial transactions. As long as the 1 percent can convince the 99 percent that social welfare benefits the undeserving among them, the 1 percent can avoid bearing any of the costs.
As a result the 1 percent who are primarily interested in low or no taxes and few regulations benefit economically. To make the case that racial resentment serves the upper 1 percent, the Democrats are going to have to tell a story that convincingly explains the role of white racial resentment to the white working-class. The story must include the diagnosis, the solution, an explanation of how the problem is solved, and evidence that the solution will work.
Union membership has declined from high of about 30 percent in 1950 to about 11 percent. Workers have also changed in how they see themselves: workers no longer see themselves as allied to each other because they hold similar jobs in an industry, but see themselves more as more aligned with management because their job role is defined by management. The definition of a working-class voter has changed; middle-class voters form a solid core of the Democratic Party; and the number of voters who have dropped into the category of poor has expanded. There are not enough “workers” in the traditional Democratic sense for the Party to win national elections.
Other Democrats call for the Democratic Party to be more like the Republican Party. By calling for the Democratic Party to become more like the Republican Party most disgruntled Democrats usually mean that the Party should become more aggressive and willing to do whatever it takes to win (e.g., gerrymander, suppress votes, and more); practice message discipline; and say or promise whatever voters want to convince them to vote Democratic. Those calling for mimicry of Republican Party, however, may not realize the extent to which the GOP changed from the party of Gerald Ford to become a cult of white voters.
Still other Democrats argue that the Democratic Party cannot be successful unless it gets money out of politics, eliminates the Electoral College, and ends voter suppression. But, those Democrats proposing changes in how elections are financed and conducted do not seem to understand how powerless the Democrats are to implement them in the face of Republican opposition to the very mechanisms that brought them to power.
All of these proposals have merit, despite any obstacles to implementing them. But, they miss addressing the key factor that has undermined the ability of the Democratic Party to win at both the national and local level: resistance by working-class whites to accepting the equality of people of color. Put simply, some white voters—more than the 20 percent who are Trump’s base--vote for Republicans because they believe the GOP better represents the cultural interests of white voters than the Democratic Party. And, to the extent that these cultural interests include resentment of people of color, an important part of the Democratic Party, they are correct.
To appeal to white voters who resent people of color, the Democratic Party needs to develop policies that counter the Republican Party’s appeal to racial resentment. Although the Democratic Party seems intent on pretending that Trump’s appeal to the white working-class is primarily due to economic insecurity, the empirical evidence shows that racial resentment rather than economics drove that vote. Trump voters want legitimacy to assuage their racial resentment, but given the base of the Democratic Party, the legitimation of white racial resentment is the one thing the Party cannot provide.
To make inroads against white racial resentment the Democratic Party must make the case that the upper 1 percent who fund the Republican Party have deliberately sharpened racial resentment to divide the bottom 99 percent. By dividing the 99 percent, they have undermined the commitment to the general welfare and weakened the civic obligation to provide for the common good. (see Democracy in Chains by Nancy MacLean) The general welfare and common good includes access to health care, educational benefits, safety net assurances (i.e., social security, programs for the poor and disabled, temporary unemployment assistance, and retraining programs for workers displaced by technical innovations and market dislocations), regulations to protect the environment, worker and public safety, and financial transactions. As long as the 1 percent can convince the 99 percent that social welfare benefits the undeserving among them, the 1 percent can avoid bearing any of the costs.
As a result the 1 percent who are primarily interested in low or no taxes and few regulations benefit economically. To make the case that racial resentment serves the upper 1 percent, the Democrats are going to have to tell a story that convincingly explains the role of white racial resentment to the white working-class. The story must include the diagnosis, the solution, an explanation of how the problem is solved, and evidence that the solution will work.